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THE VIRTUAL WILD, WILD WEST (WWW): INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE-TRADEMARKS, SERVICE
MARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND DOMAIN NAMES
Jeffrey J. Look*
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE-THE VIRTUAL LAND
RUSH
The virtual world we know as the "Internet"' has often been described as
"Cyberspace"2 or the "information superhighway," 3 terms which match the
high-tech aspect of a new tool that has become common in our homes,
schools, and businesses. The Internet is opening up many new opportunities
for people and is changing the way all of us do our jobs, transact business,
educate ourselves, communicate with others, access entertainment, and keep
ourselves informed of news and world events. All of this is now available at
our finger-tips. It is truly a new, virtual frontier. However computers and the
Internet are presenting new and challenging legal questions which may take
many years to become well-settled points of law. One area of the law which
has been dramatically affected by computer technology is in the field of
intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, copyrights, patents, and unfair competi-
tion.
The Internet today is really not unlike the Old West of 125 years ago.
Some of the challenges and disputes involving intellectual property on the
Internet are not too different from the great range wars of the 19th century.
Then the western states were basically wide open expanses of land from
Mexico to Canada. There were the cattle ranchers and barons who saw this
wide open space as essentially a highway that they should have free use over
* Jeffrey J. Look is an associate in Trademark, Copyright, and Entertainment Law with
Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A. in Little Rock and Nashville, Tennessee. Formerly a trademark
examining attorney for the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Washington. D.C., Look
is a 1990 honors graduate from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
I. Matisse Enzer, Glossary of Internet Terms (visited May 30, 1999)
<www.matisse.net/files/glossary.html>. The term "Internet" refers to a vast collection of
interconnected computer networks which use the TCP/IP protocol and which evolved from the
ARPANET in the 1960s.
2. Id. The term "Cyberspace" is credited to William Gibson, who originated the term
in his novel Neuromancer. Cyberspace currently refers to the whole range of information
resources available through computer networks.
3. MICROsoFT ENCARTA 98 ENCYCLOPEDIA, Information Superhighway (1997). The
term "information superhighway" popularly refers to the availability and use of advanced
information services by means of a variety of high-capacity data transport facilities, especially
computers and computer networks. The term was coined to convey an image of a national
infrastructure that would provide abundant information at high capacities to the general public.
It was made popular by United States Vice President Albert Gore to emphasize the importance
of such an infrastructure.
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to run cattle from -the ranches in the south to the lush pastures and rail heads
in the north. They did not want to have to pay anybody, ask permission, or
detour around. If somebody got in their way, sometimes theyjust ran through
them. On the other hand, there was the homesteader or farmer who saw space
for crops. They saw the land as something which was their domain, their
property. They wanted control over who came on their property and they did
not want cattle trampling down or eating their crops. This often led to violent
confrontations between those who saw the land as a public thoroughfare and
those who wanted to fence off and protect their property against unauthorized
intrusions by others. Then there were the Native Americans who had
traditionally occupied the land and who saw the homesteaders and cattle
ranchers as intruders.4 Today, the Internet is that wide open expanse of land.
There are some who believe that everything about the Internet should be free
for all to use and exploit for personal gain-the modem day cattle barons.5
There are others however, who would like some degree of control over how
their intellectual property rights are used in this virtual world. They want the
right to tell someone "no, you can't use my property at all" or "you can use my
property if you ask for my permission first or pay me a royalty." Hopefully,
these conflicting ideologies about the Internet will not erupt into bloodshed.
However, conflicts are arising which are being waged in courtrooms across
the country involving damage to intellectual property which is no less
damaging than a heard of longhorns trampling down a farmer's corn crop.
II. TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN NAMES COMPARED AND CONTRASTED
A good definition of trademarks and service marks can be found in
Section 45 of the Lanham Act.6 Unlike trademarks, domain names are used
4. See MICROSOFT ENCARTA 98 ENCYCLOPEDIA, Westerward Movement, American
(1997).
5. See Chris Tucker, Electronic Pirates, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES SPIRIT, Apr. 1999, at 40.
Such persons nowdays are often called "cyberlibertarians." Their credo is "information wants
to be free." Id.
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). The statutory definition of a trademark under the
Lanham Act is as follows:
[A]ny word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof (1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate [their source].
Id. The Lanham Act defines a service mark in essentially the same way, except that a service
mark is designed to "identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique
service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source
is unknown." Id.
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primarily to identify a single location on the World Wide Web.7 Typically,
a domain name is prefaced by the abbreviation "WWW." followed by a word
or words, followed by a period and one of several top level domain abbrevia-
tions, i.e..COM, .ORG, .NET, .GOV, .EDU, .INT, and .MIL. Many use or
want to use their trademarks and service marks as domain names because
when people search the web for a particular company's web site, they will
logically and instinctively use the company's name, trademarks, or service
marks run the search.
One essential requirement of a trademark or service mark is that it be
used to identify a product or service. If a trademark or service mark is never
used to identify and distinguish goods and services from those of others, it is
not a trademark or service mark under the federal Lanham Act,' the Arkansas
state trademark act,9 or even at common law.' If a trademark or service mark
owner ceases to use a mark, it is abandoned and becomes free to anyone else
to use as a mark." Domain names can be registered without actually being
used at all or they can be used in a very minimal fashion, like a door to an
empty room.
Ill. TRADEMARKS, SERVICE MARKS, AND DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) registers
trademarks and service marks. In order for a mark to be registered, it must
meet several statutory and regulatory requirements.
A. Prohibition of Confusingly Similar Marks
One of the biggest obstacles is that trademarks and service marks cannot
be confusingly similar to another federally registered mark. 2 What is
"confusingly similar" involves the application of a multi-factor balancing
test. 3 There is no mathematically precise formula for applying these factors,
7. See High Tech Dictionary (visited May 30, 1999)
<www.currents.net/resources/dictionary/definition.phtml>. The "World Wide Web" is a
reference to a hypermedia-based system for browsing Internet sites. It is a "web" of many sites
linked together which users can access by clicking on hyperlinks. Id
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-201(8), (10) (Michie Supp. 1997).
10. See United Drug v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), superseded by statute as stated in Foxtrap, Inc. v Foxtrap,
Inc., 671 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1871).
11. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17.1 (4th ed. 1997).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)(1998).
13. See In re E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Because
the trademark office is subject to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the decisions
1999]
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nor is it necessary for a plaintiff to offer evidence relevant to each factor to
prevail in an infringement case. The test, as applied by the PTO, essentially
weighs the similarity in the overall commercial impression of the marks in
terms of sound, appearance, and meaning against the similarity of the goods
or services; the similarity in the channels oftrade or overlap in the prospective
purchasers of the goods or services of the applicant and registrant; and the
sophistication of the purchasers (i.e. are they people who would casually
purchase something relatively inexpensive like a loaf of bread, or highly
trained and educated corporate purchasers who are purchasing a jumbo jet).
Sophisticated purchasers are less likely to be confused. 4 Therefore, since the
likelihood of, not the actuality of, consumer confusion is a necessary element
to support a refusal to register based on Section 2(d), if there is no likelihood
of confusion, then highly similar or identical words and names can and often
are registered as trademarks and service marks for goods and services which
are unrelated. 5
of its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the PTO follows the test
announced in E.I. duPont. See id. The elements of the duPont test include the following: (I)
The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation, and commercial impression; (2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the
goods or services as described in an application or registration in connection with which a prior
mark is in use; (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels; (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. "impulse"
vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length
of use); (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) The nature and
extent of any actual confusion; (8) The length of time during and conditions under which there
has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) The variety of goods on
which a mark is used or is not used (house mark, "family" mark, product mark); (10) The market
interface between the applicant and the owner of a prior mark f]; (I1) The extent to which
applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) The extent of
potential confusion, i.e. whether de minimis or substantial; (13) Any other established fact
probative of the effect of use. See id.
The Eighth Circuit test for determining likelihood of confusion includes the following
factors: (1) the strength of the trademark; (2) the similarity between the parties' marks; (3) the
competitive proximity of the parties' products; (4) the alleged infringer's intent to confuse; (5)
evidence ofactual confusion; (6) the degree of care reasonably expected of potential consumers.
See Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publishing Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 1996);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
14. See Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 1995); Sunbeam
Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1950); Save-A-Stop, Inc. v. Sav-A-Stop,
Inc., 230 Ark. 319, 322 S.W.2d 454 (1959) (holding that professional buyers "should be capable
of a reasonable degree of discrimination").
15. Attached in the appendix is a list of various federal trademark registrations for the
marks APPLE, MERCURY, and DELTA. The list shows the owner and a brief description of
the goods and services, Not all of the federal registrations for these marks are listed. As can
be seen, fanciful and arbitrary marks can co-exist on the Principal Trademark Register and can
be used in commerce without likelihood of consumer confusion.
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B. Other Statutory Prohibitions
Just because a mark may not be confusingly similar to another mark does
not necessarily entitle the mark to be registered on the Principal Register.
Other major statutory prohibitions to federal registration include prohibitions
on merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive marks; geographically
descriptive wording; geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks;
surnames; scandalous, false, deceptive, and disparaging marks; generic terms;
and use of service marks without some connection to a service. 6
I. Merely Descriptive or Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks
To register a merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive mark
requires a showing of "acquired distinctiveness" and "secondary meaning."7
A merely descriptive mark immediately and forthwith conveys to the
consumer important or key information about a function, purpose, quality,
characteristic, or use of the goods and services.' Deceptively misdescriptive
terms are false, but plausible, terms which would otherwise be merely
descriptive. 9 To acquire distinctiveness, a mark must have widespread,
continuous, and exclusive use in commerce for at least five years.2" However,
widespread promotion or advertising by a single source over a shorter period
of time may sometimes result in acquired distinctiveness.
2. Geographically Descriptive Wording
Geographically descriptive marks cannot be registered without a showing
of acquired distinctiveness.2' The test for determining whether a mark is
primarily geographically descriptive is: (1) the primary significance is
geographic; (2) purchasers would likely think that the goods or services
originate from the place named in the mark; (3) the mark identifies the
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1998).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1998). See also Armstrong Paint & Varnishworks v. Nu-Enamel
Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938); Zatarains, Inc., v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th
Cir. 1983).
18. See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also In re Bed and Breakfast
Registry, 791 F.2d 157 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
19. See In re Woodward & Lothrope. Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1412 (TTAB 1987): In
re Quady Winery, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1213 (TTAB 1984); PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. DEPT. OFCOMMERCE TRADEMARK MANUALOF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.03 (2d ed.,
last revised April 1997).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1998); 37 C.F.R. § 2.41.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2)(1998).
1999]
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geographic origin of the goods or services..2' An example of such a mark
would be ARKANSAS PIZZA for a pizza restaurant based in Arkansas.
3. Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks
These types of marks cannot be registered at all unless they acquired
distinctiveness prior to the enactment of the .North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) on December 8, 1993.23 The test for determining
whether a mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive is: (1)
the primary significance of the mark is geographic; (2) purchasers would
likely think the goods or services originate from the geographic place named
in the mark; (3) the goods or services do not originate from the place named
in the mark.24An example is use of the name ARKANSAS PIZZA for a pizza
restaurant based in Texas.
4. Surnames
Words which are primarily merely surnames cannot be registered unless
they have acquired distinctiveness. 25 Not all surnames, however, are primarily
merely surnames. Basically, if a surname has any other significant connota-
tion or meaning which is not merely a surname or if a surname is displayed in
a stylized form or used with other, non-generic wording, then they can be
registered. 26  Types of surnames which would not be primarily merely
surnames would be: LOOK, BROWN, PATRICK. Types of names would be
primarily merely surnames: JONES, SMITH, LOPEZ.
5. Scandalous, False, Deceptive and Disparaging Marks
Marks which are immoral or scandalous, or deceptive, or which suggest
a false connection to someone or some organization or institution, or which
may disparage someone or bring someone or a company or institution into
disrepute, cannot be registered no matter how distinctive they may otherwise
be.
27
22. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19, § 1210.05.
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3).
24. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19. § 1210.06.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4).
26. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19, § 1211.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). See also In re Perry Mfg. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751 (TTAB
1989) (holding that false designations of geographic origin which materially influence the
purchasing decision are deceptive where the geographic term "New York" was used for clothing
goods not made in New York); In re Budge Mfg. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
[Vol. 22
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6. Generic terms
A trademark or service mark cannot be a generic term for the goods or
services, that is, it cannot describe a particular genus of goods and services.2"
7. Service Marks
One particular wrinkle with service marks is their requisite use in
connection with a service rather than simply an activity performed by a
business. The PTO defines a service as something which is a real activity
performed primarily for the benefit of a someone else and which is not
ancillary or incidental to the performance of the larger business of the
applicant.29 The most common examples of activities which are not consid-
ered services are advertising and marketing a busines's own goods and
services, even to the public, and the act of selling goods and services. Retail
stores and mail order catalogs may get around this problem because the nature
of the service they provide is the bringing together of a wide variety of goods
and services, typically made by others, into one location for convenient
display and access for the consumer. However, it is not the act of selling
which allows a retail store to claim that it is providing a service.
IV. REGISTRATION OF DOMAIN NAMES
Computer domain names are not registered by the Patent and Trademark
Office but are registered in this country one of several authorized domain
name registries.3" All of the requirements discussed previously in connection
(finding statements as to the material composition of the goods were deceptive); In re McGinley,
660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (including obscene or indecent terms or depictions). In addition,
marks which allude to or suggest a possible, but false, connection to another source, institution,
or person are prohibited. See, e.g., Buffett v. Chi-Chi's, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428 (TIAB
1985) (holding that a restaurant's use of the mark MARGARITAVILLE falsely suggested a
connection to singer Jimmy Buffett); In re Sauer, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1073 (TTAB 1993)
(holding that a depiction of a football with baseball lacing and the words "BO BALL" falsely
suggested a connection to dual professional baseball/football player Bo Jackson). But see
University of Notre Dame v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(finding that cheese sold under the name "Notre Dame" was not a false association with Notre
Dame University because the university was not known for cheese making, nor did the term
Notre Dame point uniquely or exclusively to Notre Dame University).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1998).
29. See also In re Canadian Pacific Ltd., 754 F.2d 992 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Betz
Paperchem, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 89 (TTAB 1984); In re Integrated Resources, Inc., 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (TTAB 1983); In re Landmark Communications, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 692 (TTAB 1979).
30. Until May 1999 there was only one domain name registry in the United States which
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with the registration of trademarks and service marks do not apply to domain
names. As a result, domain names may be surnames (i.e. www.smith.com);
merely descriptive, generic names for goods or services (i.e.
www.flowers.com for electronic retailing of flowers or www.dentist.com for
a website that provides nationwide dental referrals or promotes a specific
dentist's office); and geographically descriptive or misdescriptive names (i.e.
www.arkansaspoultrv.or2 for a trade organization promoting the consumption
of Arkansas poultry products). The only prohibition on domain names is that
they may not be exactly like any other domain name already registered." The
key is "exactly." Because domain names serve to identify a single location on
the Internet, even minor variations in a word or phrase will accomplish this
goal. However, minor variations may not be enough to avoid confusion as to
the source of the website for the computer user.
A good illustration is Toys R Us, Inc. v. Abir.32 In Abir, the defendant
discovered that neither TOYS R US nor KIDS R US had registered as a
domain name an incorrect spelling of their marks, i.e. www.toysareus.com and
www.kidsareus.com.33 Abir thought he would do the company a favor, and
make some money for himself, by registering these domain names and then
selling or leasing them back to Toys R Us. 4 He was shocked when Toys R
Us responded to his offer by threatening legal action. Abir then decided that
he would sell toys for competitors through the websites 5 Toys R-Us brought
a trademark infringement and trademark dilution claim against Abir, who
admitted in court that he adopted the misspelled marks hoping to pickup
visitors who incorrectly entered Toys R Us's domain names.3 6 The court had
no trouble issuing an injunction against Abir and ordered him to give up the
websites. Because Abir was found to have willfully and intentionally
infringed the Toys R Us marks, he was ordered to pay Toys R Us's attorney's
fees in the amount of $55,000."
The lesson to be learned from Abir is to not forget to check the phonetic
equivalents of a company's marks and names. For example, if the mark is
was operated by Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI). Now there are more than two dozen companies
registering domain names. However, the procedures used for registering a domain name with
any of the registries are similar to those used by NSI.
31. See, e.g., Help, Reservation, Availability of Web Addresses File (visited June 4, 1999)
<www.networksolutions.com>.
32. 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944(S.D.N.Y. 1997), injunction granted, No. 97-Civ.-8673
(JGK), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22435, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1997).
33. See Abir, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1946.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1947.
37. See Toys R Us v. Abir, No. 97-Civ.-8673 (JGK), 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1275, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1999).
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ARKSYS, one should check for domain names that use similar spellings such
as ARCSYS, ARKSIS, ARCSIS, ARK-SYS, ARC-SIS, ARXSIS, and any
other conceivable variations. The use of any of these variations by a
competitor could be considered service mark infringement or dilution.
Unscrupulous competitors are not the only ones who infringe or dilute a
company's trademarks and service marks over the Internet. Often times a
company's mark is registered as a domain name by people who are angry or
upset with a company by adding the word "SUCKS" to whatever the mark
may happen to be. Some companies who have actually faced this issue
include: (1) Netscape, who ran into a problem with NETSCAPESUCKS, a
website created specifically to allow people who do not like the Netscape web
browser to take pot shots and post derogatory information about the product
on the Internet; (2) Chase Manhattan Bank, who ran into a problem with a
complaint website called CHASEMANHATTANSUCKS; and (4) Bally Total
Fitness Health Clubs, wherethe website BALLYSUCKS was created as a
complaint site for people upset with the health club.38 The user of the
BALLYSUCKS name recently won summary judgment against Bally Total
Fitness who sued him for trademark infringement and dilution. 9 The court
held that no prudent consumer would assume that Bally's official website and
the defendant's BALLYSUCKS website originated from the same source.4"
The court found no trademark dilution because the defendant was using the
site to make legitimate criticisms of Bally Total Fitness. This court held that
trademark owners may not quash unauthorized use of the mark by a person
expressing a point of view.4'
V. PTO REGISTRATION OFDOMAIN NAMES
The PTO will, on occasion, register what ordinarily is considered a
domain name if it can be shown to also meet the requirements for federal
registration as a trademark or service mark.42 But a PTO registration does not
automatically reserve the name on the Internet. Only a domain name registry
can do that. The PTO policy requires the applicant to show that it offers
services via the Internet and the applicant must provide specimens which show
use of the domain name as a service mark, rather than simply as a URL or
38. See Netscape Bucks Netscapesucks.com, INTA BULLETIN (International Trademark
Association, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1, 1999, at 6.
39. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1663 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
40. See id
41. See id. at 1167.
42. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Examination of Domain
Names (visited June 4, 1999) <www.uspto.gov/web/office/tac/domain/tmdomain>.
19991
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Internet address.4 3 Secondly, the information contained on the website must
not merely advertise or promote one's own goods or services." The PTO
examiner will check the website for this purpose. If the website also does
something besides promoting a company's own goods and services then
registration of the domain name is possible with the PTO. For example, a
website owned by a package delivery service may in fact advertise its various
services. However, if it also contains an automated tracking feature which
allows the user to input a number to find out where their package is, then a
service is being provided. In addition, a manufacturer of clothing or shoes
may advertise its own clothing and footwear products on its website.
However, if it provides a means for consumers to order those goods through
the website, such as an on-line or electronic catalog, a service is being
provided. Also, a public interest health organization may seek to promote its
worthwhile efforts related to curing cancer or some other type of disease. But,
if it merely advertises or promotes what it does over the Internet, then it is not
providing a service which would allow the PTO to register its domain name
as a service mark. If, on the other hand, it provides factual or statistical
information about a particular health issue, information like which would be
found in a news report or encyclopedia entry, then it is providing a service
which is referred to in PTO parlance as providing information about cancer,
or providing information about healthy living via a global computer informa-
tion network.
How an applicant identifies or describes the nature of its services to the
PTO is critical in getting a federal registration. The PTO will not let
applicants broaden or change the scope of their identification once the
application is filed. Applicants, however, may always narrow their identifica-
tion. For example, applicants may delete things, or clarify an ambiguous
identification. The change must fall within the scope of the original
identification and not consist of something completely new.45 For example,
if an applicant states on the federal trademark application "website which
advertises automobiles," the website must feature third party classified ads of
automobiles. If the applicant is actually advertising its own cars and providing
a means for the customer to order custom made automobiles via a global
computer network, it may not change its identification to state this after the
application is filed. The PTO has also published on its website guidelines on
acceptable identifications for services provided over the Internet.46
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See In re M.V. Et. Associes, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1628 (Comm'r Patents 1991 ). See
also 37 C.F.R. § 2.71(b); PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19, § 804.01.
46. See Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Identification and
(Vol. 22
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The PTO will not allow applicants to use the word "Internet" in their
identification of goods and services on the application. The reason is because
"INTERNET" was registered as a federal service mark in 1984 for providing
electronic data transmission services in the electronic banking field.47
INTERNET was also registered in 1980 as a mark for travel agency services.4
The travel agency registration will be up for renewal in 2000. The banking
registration is now subject to an on-going cancellation proceeding before the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board based on the ground that it is now a
generic term." Unless and until the INTERNET registrations are canceled,
the PTO requires applicants to use "global computer information network" as
a substitute. The reason is that the PTO does not permit the use of registered
trademarks or service marks in identifications of goods and services because
using registered marks in identifications tends to "genericize" the mark.
There was a time when the PTO would refuse to register any trademark
or service mark which included the word INTERNET in the mark because of
the above mentioned registrations. The PTO's current position is that the
word INTERNET is merely descriptive matter if it involves any type of
service provided over the Internet except in the financial services, banking,
investment services, and travel industries. Therefore, PTO will refuse to
register a mark like REGIONS INTERNET for on-line or electronic banking
services based on the likelihood of confusion with the above banking
registration. On the other hand, it will not refuse to register HOME DEPOT
INTERNET for a service of providing home remodeling information via a
website.5
The PTO also routinely uses Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 2 the
prohibition against mere descriptiveness, to refuse registration to many
INTERNET marks. Therefore, if the mark in its entirety merely describes the
type of service being provided, then it will be refused unless the applicant can
show acquired distinctiveness. For example, if a mark is INTERNET AUTOS
for a service which runs classified ads for cars over the Internet, or IN-
TERNET DATING SERVICE for an Internet dating service, then the marks
Classification of Certain Computer Related Goods and Services (visited June 4, 1999)
<www. uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/domain/domcl.html>.
47. See U.S. Registration No. 1560167.
48. See U.S. Registration No. 1137022.
49. See Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Cancellation Proceeding No. 023324.
50. See Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Identification and
Classification of Certain Computer Related Goods and Services (visited June 4, 1999)
<www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/domain/domcl.html>.
51. However, Home Depot would have to disclaim exclusivity in the word "Internet" apart
from the mark because "Internet" is merely descriptive.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1998).
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will be refused registration on the Principal Register because they are merely
descriptive of the services."
VI. CURRENT ISSUES INVOLVING DOMAIN NAMES
Domain name registries do not search federal trademarks prior to
registering any particular domain name. Therefore, registered trademarks and
service marks owned by one party can and do get registered as domain names
by third parties. Some of these people have no relationship with the trademark
owner and their sole motive for registration of the domain name is to sell it
back to the true owner. Such persons are often referred to as
"cybersquatters."54
Many cybersquatters are not proactive. That is, they generally do not
register a company's name or mark and then let them know it. There have
been exceptions such as in the Abir case. In most cases, however, the
cybersquatter will likely wait for the trademark owner to approach them. How
does one know if they have a problem with a cybersquatter? Confused
customers may call or write saying that they tried to access what they thought
was the trademark owner's website and got something unexpected, such as
pornography, or a competitor's product, by mistake. Cybersquatters are also
found by accident such as from employees of the trademark owner surfing the
web either at work or at home. Some large companies are now employing
"Bounty Hunters" or "Cyber Paralegals" on a full-time, 40-hour-per-week
basis, just to surf the web to find misuse of company names, trademarks,
copyrights, and other intellectual property rights on the Internet. There are
also private companies that specialize in bounty hunting such as NetNames"
in New York City, Thomson & Thomson,5 6 a Boston-based trademark
searching firm, and Markwatch" which specializes in searching for improper
trademark usage on websites.
53. See In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
It may be possible to get such marks, if they are already in use in commerce, registered on the
Supplemental Register, which is specifically designed for marks which are capable but have not
yet acquired distinctiveness. However, if the mark is generic, then it is not capable of acquiring
distinctiveness. The PTO has the burden to prove a mark is generic. See id.
54. See Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. I1. 1996); Andrew Craig,
Domain Name Group Targets Cybersquatters (January 19, 1998)
<http://www.techweb.com/news/story/TWB9980119S004>; Laura Lorek, Beware of
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VII. HOW TO GET RID OF CYBERSQUATTERS-THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCESS
A. Steps the Complaining Party Must Take to Initiate the Process
In certain circumstances, a trademark owner can avoid going to court by
taking advantage of a domain name registry's dispute resolution policy. 8 The
policy is convoluted. The complainant must first submit an original, certified
copy, not more than six months old, of a federal trademark registration
certificate which is in full force and effect, on the Principal trademark register
for any country in the world, and substantially identical to a second level
domain name. 9 Trademarks registered on the Supplement Register of the
United States or any similar register in any other country or any state
trademark registration will not be acceptable. Trademarks which incorporate
design elements, even if registered on a Principal register, will not be
accepted. Pending federal trademark applications are not acceptable.60 The
complaining party must also provide the registry with a copy of the "cease and
desist" letter sent to the domain name registrant datedprior tofiling of the
complaint with the registry which indicates the mode of delivery of the letter
and the factual basis for believing the domain name registrant received the
notice. In addition, the address on the letter must match the address of the
domain name registrant in the registry's database of registrants.6 For
example, Network Solutions Inc. (NCI)'s "WHOIS" database is a computer-
ized record of the name, address, and technical information of each domain
name registrant and is accessible to the public via NSI's InterNic website.
The letter must also state that the complainant believes the domain name
registration violates the complainant's trademark rights and it must state the
factual and legal bases for this belief.62
Once NSI or a similar registry receives material from the complaining
party, the registry will determine the creation date of the registrant's domain
name. If the domain name creation date is after the effective date of a valid
certified trademark registration, the registry will ask the domain name
registrant to supply proof of the registrant's own federally registered
trademark or service mark which must also meet the same requirements
58. See Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy (Revision 3, Feb. 25, 1998)
<http://rs.internic.net/domain-info/interNic-domain-6.html>.
59. See id The second level domain name is the part of the domain name that appears






discussed above. This proof must be supplied within 30 days of the,request.
The domain name registrant's certified trademark registration's effective date
must be prior to the date of any third party's notice of a dispute, i.e. their
"cease and desist" letter.63 For example, if the complaining party's cease and
desist letter is dated April 1, 1999, the domain name registrant's trademark
registration date must be prior to April 1, 1999. If the domain name registrant
meets these requirements, the domain name dispute is over as far as the
domain name registries are concerned. The domain name registrant will keep
the name and it will not matter which federal trademark registration was
issued first.
If the domain name registrant can't meet these requirements, i.e. the
domain name registrant can't supply proof of a federal trademark registration
at all or its trademark registration is dated after the complaining party's cease
and desist letter, but the domain name registrant wishes to contest the right of
the complainant to the domain name, then the domain name will be placed on
a "Hold" status and will not be available to anyone to use while this status is
in effect."
If either the domain name registrant or the complainant become involved
in litigation over the right to use the name, either party may file a file-marked
copy of the court complaint with the registry and the registry will maintain the
status quo. Specifically, the name will either remain active and in the
possession of the domain name registrant during the pendency of the litigation
or, if the domain name is on "Hold" status, the name will remain in "Hold"
status and the registry will deposit the domain name registration to the registry
of the court. When a domain name is on "Hold" status, neither party will be
able to use the domain name until the litigation is resolved and the court issues
an order awarding the domain name to either the complainant or the original
registrant.6" All domain name registrants must keep paying annual renewal
fees during the period that the domain name is on "Hold" status.'
B. Options Available to a Client Who Has a Conflict with Another
Domain Name Registration
Ownership of a federal trademark or service mark registration, in typed
form, is critical to anybody wanting to use a domain name dispute resolution
policy and it does not matter whether one is a complainant or a domain name
63. See id.
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registrant. It will not do a complainant any good to run into a problem with
a domain name registration first and then apply for a federal trademark
registration. Likewise, if a domain name registrant does not have a federal
trademark or service mark registration, the registrant will not be able to keep
the domain name active during any dispute over the name. Again, filing or
obtaining a trademark registration after the domain name dispute has arisen
will not help the domain name registrant.
If a client does not own a federal trademark or service mark registration,
and wants to use its mark as an Internet domain name which is already taken
by a squatter or someone else, the client has a variety of options: (1) buy the
domain name; (2) sue the doman name registrant for trademark infringement;
(3) vary the domain name; or (4) enter into an agreement to provide mutual
website links.
1. Buy the Domain Name
A client may decide to purchase the domain name from the registrant,
who is basically free to name his or her price. Many domain names may be
purchased for a few thousand dollars. One of the largest payoffs for a domain
name to date involved the Alta Vista domain name. Compaq Computers
agreed to pay a San Jose, California man $3.35 million for the domain name
www.altavista.com. This amount is believed to be the record amount paid for
a domain name. The Alta Vista name was not registered as a trademark when
an electrical engineer, Jack Marshall, obtained the www.altavista.com domain
name in 1994. Marshall designed software which could be used for creating
multi-media postcards for display on the web. In 1995, Digital Corporation,
which later merged with Compaq Computers, launched the "Alta Vista"
search engine. Digital initially registered www.altavista.digital.com as the
domain name. However, many computer users would omit the "digital"
portion from the domain name when looking for the search engine's website.
As a consequence, they would access Marshall's website which was soon
getting hundreds of thousands of hits per day. This enabled him to get
premium prices for placing advertisements on his website for others, not to
mention the overwhelming exposure to his own products that he would not
otherwise have received. Because ofthe confusion between Compaq's search
engine located at www.altavista.digital.com and Marshall's
www.altavista.com, Compaq sued Marshall to force him to change his mark
and to add a disclaimer to his site. In settling the case, Compaq agreed to pay
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$3.35 million plus it gave Marshall a permanent link from the AltaVista
search engine to his new website, www.photolof.com.67
It should be noted that Marshall, in the AltaVista case, was not a
cybersquatter. Marshall had legitimate and superior rights in the AltaVista
mark. In cases where the domain name registrant has a legitimate claim to the
name, i.e. he is using it in connection with his own business which happens
to be less famous than someone else's business, the courts typically allow the
first to register the domain name to keep the domain name.6"
2. Sue the Domain Name Registrant for Trademark Infringement or
Dilution
A successful suit may result in a court order for the domain name
registrant to transfer the name. However, as many cybersquatters know, it will
often cost a company much more to litigate this issue rather than pay a ransom
of a few thousand dollars. On the other hand, paying off a cybersquatter can
embolden them or others like them to register more of your client's marks
knowing that your client will pay the ransom rather than litigate.69
In June 1999, Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Patrick Leahy of
Vermont introduced a bill in the United States Senate70 to make
cybersquatting a violation of Section 43 of the Trademark Act.7' The bill
would largely codify what many federal courts have already been doing in bad
faith cybersquatting cases such as issuing injunctions and awarding attorney
fees. However, two new provisions have been added that will make pursuing
cybersquatters much more attractive for trademark owners. One is allowing
trademark owners to file in rem actions against the domain name itself in
cases where the domain name registrant can't be found or otherwise made
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the federal court. The second is the
awarding of statutory damages similar to those found in Section 504 of the
67. See Julia Angwin, San Jose Man Hits Gold, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 28, 1998.
68. See Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or. 1997)
(finding that competing users of the same mark in connection with unrelated goods and services,
first to register domain name was allowed to keep it).
69. See, e.g., Toys R Us v. Abir, No. 97-Civ-8673, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1275 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 5, 1999). This is a tough business decision for a client. Some companies, however, view
negotiating with cybersquatters like negotiating with terrorists and would rather spend $50,000
suing a cybersquatter than the $5,000 the cybersquatter wants for the domain name. Now that
cybersquatting is becoming more disfavored by courts, it is becoming easier to get an award of
attorney's fees for willful infringement against cybersquatters.
70. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S. 1255, 106th Cong. (1999). The
bill was passed by the Senate on August 16, 1999, and sent to the House.
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998).
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Copyright Act, ranging from $1000 to $100,000 per domain name
infringement.72
However, in order to take advantage of the Bill's provisions, should it
become law, the trademark in question would have to be "distinctive" when
the domain name was registered. It is interesting to note that the Senate Bill
has dropped the "famous and distinctive" requirement as is used in the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act and focuses merely on a mark being "distinctive,"as
the Ninth Circuit recently noted "fame" and "distinctiveness" are not the same
and proof that a mark may be distinctive is not proof that it is "famous." '73
Secondly, the Bill would provide defenses such as fair use, any legitimate
prior use by the domain name owner, and any trademark rights of the domain
name owner be considered in determining whether the defendant is a
cybersquatter.74 In other words, concurrent users of a trademark will still have
a "race" to be first to register their trademark as a domain name and those who
have legitimate comment or criticism of a company may still be able to use
another's mark in their domain name under the doctrine of fair use. The bill
would also have no effect on those who squat on descriptive or generic
domain names.
The bill would also exempt domain name registries from all liability to
a trademark owner for registering a domain name that infringes or dilutes the
trademark owner's mark unless the registry had a bad faith intent to profit
from the registration of the name.75 Domain name registries would also be
exempt from liability for terminating or otherwise suspending use of a domain
name to registrants accused of cybersquatting even if it is later determined that
the domain name registrant is not a cybersquatter. 76
3. Vary the Domain Name
Clients may decide to cleverly vary the domain name so that it is not
exactly like the registered domain name as Digital did by initially registering
"altavista.digital.com." Digital essentially added its house mark to its product
mark. As another example, if the desired domain name is "xyz.com" and it is
already taken, try adopting "xyz.arkansas.com," or putting in hyphens or entity
designators, i.e. "xyz-inc.com," "x-y-z.com" or a generic word for the goods
or services such as "xyzcars.com" if your client sells cars, for example.
However, don't get too clever by adopting a name that may be a trademark
72. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 4 (1999).
73. See Avery Dennison v. Sampton, No. 98-55810, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 19954 (9th Cir.
Aug. 23, 1999).
74. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
75. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999).
76. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999).
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infringement or dilution of another's mark. Domain name applicants should
only pursue these options if they already have a legitimate claim to the mark
and it is reasonably certain they will not infringe or dilute someone else's
mark.
4. Enter into an Agreement with the Owner of the Website to Provide
Mutual Links
An example of this strategy is the domain name "DELTA." The
appendix includes a list of DELTA trademark registrations. However, only
one entity can own the domain name www.delta.com. The owner of this
domain name registration is an Internet Service Provider (ISP) called
DELTACOMM. Those who access this website and who are looking for the
websites of Delta Airlines, Delta Faucets, Delta International Power Tools, or
Delta University may click on a hypertext link on DELTACOMM'S
homepage and link directly to the websites of these other companies.
Needless to say, this method requires the cooperation and reasonableness of
the owner of the domain name.
VIII. WHO IS LIABLE FOR REGISTERING INFRINGING DOMAIN NAMES AND
WHAT KIND OF RELIEF IS AVAILABLE?
A. NSI Liability
Often the owner of the infringing website is either anonymous, a
financial turnip, or is located in a foreign country making it difficult to get real
or immediate relief from a domain name infringement. Plaintiffs who have
tried to sue Network Solutions, Inc. for registering a domain name which
infringes or dilutes their trademarks have thus far not been successful."
While these cases were decided prior to the expansion of the number of
domain name registries, they will likely be applicable to the new registries as
well.
77. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D.
Cal. 1997). The court held that NSI has no duty to screen domain names which incorporate or
are confusingly similar to registered trademarks or service marks owned by a Plaintiff. See id.
at 967. The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, the group that issues the "Oscar"
awards, also struck out in an attempt to get an injunction against NSI for registering domain
names which are confusingly similar to or infringe the Academy's trademarks. See Academy
of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal.
1997). The court said the act of registering domain names did not constitute a commercial use
of the marks and there was no evidence of knowledge on the part of NSI to support a claim of
contributory trademark infringement. See id. at 1280.
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B. The Doctrine of Contributory Trademark Infringement
Clients seeking to hold an Internet service provider (ISP), webpage
hosting service, or bulletin board service (BBS) liable for assisting someone
else in committing a direct trademark infringement may possibly use the
doctrine of contributory trademark infringement. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the test for contributory trademark infringement is: (1) the
defendant intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark; or (2)
continues to supply a product to one who it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement.7" To apply the doctrine of contributory
trademark infringement to ISPs, BBSs, or webpage hosters, would require a
showing that the service had knowledge or had reason to know that its users
or subscribers were committing acts of trademark infringement and that the
service did nothing to stop the infringing activity once the service became
aware of it. A successful contributory infringement claim is also dependent
on a finding that the alleged direct trademark infringer was in fact infringing.
In order to hold an ISP, BBS, or webpage hoster liable for contributory
trademark infringement clients should put the service on notice by sending
copies of any "cease and desist" letters sent to the direct infringer as well as
copies of any federal trademark registrations that the client may have for their
trademarks.
C. Type of Relief Available
I. Injunctions
Perhaps the most important thing is getting the cybersquatter shut down
as soon as possible. This is particularly important in situations where the
squatter is publishing pornography on the Internet through the use of a domain
name similar to the client's trademark,79 where a competitor is taking
advantage of a client's business goodwill by selling its products and services
under marks which are confusingly similar to the client's marks,"° or where
the squatter is angry at the client's business or organization and is publishing
defamatory or derogatory information about its products or services by using
78. See Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). A recent Ninth Circuit
opinion held that the operator of a flea market who rented booth space to people with
knowledge they were selling bootleg copies of musical recordings could be liable for
contributory trademark infringement. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259
(9th Cir. 1996).
79. See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
80. See Toys R Us v. Abir, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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the client's marks and logos.8 One could also get an injunction ordering that
the squatter transfer the domain name.82
2. Damages
Generally under both the Lanham Act and the Federal Anti-dilution
statute, one must show that the defendant had willful or knowing intent to
infringe in order to get money damages for the infringement. Likewise, an
award of attorneys fees is not automatic simply because your client wins the
case. Willfulness or an intent to infringe or dilute must be shown to get an
award of attorneys fees under these Acts.83
IX. WHO SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT CYBERSQUATTERS?
A. Famous People or Companies
People or companies that have any degree of fame or notoriety should be
concerned about cybersquatters. Because registration of domain names is
relatively cheap (just a few years ago it was free) and because neither NSI nor
any other domain name registries investigate the legitimacy of anyone's claim
to a name prior to registering the domain name,84 thousands of corporate and
personal names have already been registered by third parties.
B. Political Candidates
People running for state and federal office should be extremely worried
about cybersquatters. Already, domain name speculators are registering
names for possible presidential candidates with the intent to auction them off
to the highest bidder, whether it be the actual candidate, her competitor, or
anyone else who doesn't like the candidate or the party to which she belongs.
81. See, e.g., Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998). See also
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y
1997), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3rd Cir. 1998).
82. See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision Int'l
LP v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp.
1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
83. See 15 U.S.C §§ 1117(a), 1125(c) (1998). See also Toys R Us v. Abir, No. 97-Civ.-
8673, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1275 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1999).
84. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
85. See, e.g., Lawrence Arnold, Forbes Learns Lesson About Speed of Business on the
Web, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Group, All File;
Donna Ladd, King Of The URLS, THE VILLAGE VOICE, May 4, 1999 at 37. See also
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While the names of presidential candidates are likely the most lucrative
domain names to cybersquatters, there is absolutely no reason why this
activity could not be applied to candidates for statewide or local offices.
Since many people now get news and information, even local news, via the
Internet, a candidate for a local city council or school board seat in a relatively
small town could run into a problem like this if the race is hotly contested.
Since it only costs someone $70 to register a domain name with most domain
name registries, an opponent to a political candidate in year 2000 elections
could register his likely opponent's or the incumbent's name and then start
blasting him or her on the Internet. Since someone's status as a political
candidate is not a service as defined in either the state or federal trademark or
dilution acts, they would not be able to use trademark or unfair competition
laws to get rid of the derogatory website.8 Therefore, those who are
considering running for political office in 2000 should lock up their domain
names now.
X. SHIFTS IN SQUATTING
Because those who thought they would get rich from squatting on famous
marks are finding that they are in fact getting sued and almost always losing,
many cybersquatters are shifting toward squatting on highly descriptive and
generic terms, such as www.lawyer.com. From a trademark use and
registration standpoint, the word "LAWYER" for use in connection with legal
services is unregistrable and not capable of functioning as a service mark for
legal services. However, the value of such a website to a law firm may be
enormous. Therefore, cybersquatters who snatch up these kinds of domain
names will likely earn big money by selling or leasing generic and highly
descriptive domain names and they will be virtually immune from trademark
infringement and dilution lawsuits because of the high degree of descriptive-
ness inherent in the domain names."
<http://www.presidentialelection.com>. This cybersquatter is holding an on-line public auction
of this domain name to the highest bidder.
86. While it is possible that a state or local political candidate could possibly use the law
of defamation against the owner of the derogatory website, defamation law may not be wholly
effective because the court is likely to determine that the candidate-plaintiff is a public figure
under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
87. Incidentally, www.lawyer.com has already been registered to Mail.com, who leases




XI. DOMAIN NAMES AND TRADEMARK OR SERVICE MARK DILUTION
Just because a trademark or service mark is not being infringed by the use
or registration of a domain name does not mean that the domain name
registrant is not diluting the trademark or service mark under either the
Federal Anti-Dilution Act,88 ora state anti-dilution act.89 Dilution statutes are
designed to protect the distinctive quality of famous and distinctive trade-
marks and service marks. Unlike infringement, there is no requirement that
the respective users of a mark or name are directly competitive in their
respective businesses or that consumer confusion exists. All that is required
is that the junior user's commercial use of the mark dilute the distinctive
quality of another mark." The key language in this and in many state acts are
the words "FAMOUS AND DISTINCTIVE." If a mark is weak or descrip-
tive, and has not acquired a wide degree of fame at least regionally or
nationally for the federal act,9 or within the state under a state act, then the
mark cannot be diluted. Likewise, some marks which are relatively famous
are, nevertheless, not distinctive because of a wide degree of use of the same
or similar marks by other parties.92 Domain names which incorporate famous
and distinctive marks have been found to be dilutions of famous and
distinctive marks. The state and federal anti-dilution statutes use the wording
famous and distinctive, not famous or distinctive, meaning that fame and
distinctiveness are required in order to take advantage of federal and state
anti-dilution acts. The appendix of this article includes lists showing various
owners for the marks APPLE, MERCURY, and DELTA on differing types of
goods and services. Some of these marks are more famous than others and
none of the marks are merely descriptive or even suggestive of the nature of
their goods and services. Therefore, they would probably be considered
"fanciful" or "inherently distinctive" marks. However, none of these
trademark owners would likely be able to use the dilution statute to prevent
any and all other use of these marks by third parties. They might be able to
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1998).
89. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-213 (Michie 1996), which is highly similar in
wording to the federal act.
90. See the definition of dilution in 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-
201(3).
91. See Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (D. Haw. 1996)
(finding that fame in one state is not sufficient under federal anti-dilution statute). See also
Wawa Dairy Farms v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that fame in
five states was sufficient under the federal anti-dilution statute), affd. 116 F.3d 471 (3rd Cir.
1997).
92. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999); Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, No. 98-55810, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 19954 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
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use a dilution claim, however, to stop others from using similar marks in the
particular field that they do business in and are famous to the consuming
public for. For example, Delta Airlines might be able to use the dilution
statute in an action involving airline services or other types of transportation
and travel services. This would also likely meet the tests for a trademark
infringement. However, the airline would not likely be able to use the federal
or a state dilution statute such as Arkansas' statute to stop someone from
selling a brand of cheese under the trademark DELTA.
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen93 is a case involving well-known
"Cybersquatter," Dennis Toeppen. Toeppen had registered numerous famous
trademarks and service marks as domain names with the intent to "sell" them
off to the trademark owners for a substantial profit. 4 One of the marks
Toeppen registered was www.intermatic.com." Intermatic owned five
incontestable federal trademark registrations for the mark INTERMATIC for
various electrical products."' Intermatic did not find out about Toeppen until
it tried to register the www.intermatic.com domain name with InterNic 7
Because of Toeppen's prior, registration, Internic refused to register
Intermatic's domain name application.98 Intermatic sued Toeppen for
trademark infringement and dilution. The court found that Intermatic had
spent about $16 million in advertising its products in the eight years prior to
the court's decision." It had been using the INTERMATIC mark on its
products for about 50 years. ° The judge granted summary judgement in
favor of Intermatic under the federal anti-dilution statute. Important factors
in granting the summary judgement included Intermatic's long use of the
mark, the fact that the mark was "fanciful," that is, it did not merely describe
or was not highly suggestive of the nature of the goods, that Intermatic had
federal trademark registrations for the mark, and that Intermatic had exclusive
use of the mark prior to Toeppen's registration of the domain name. Further,
Toeppen had never used the INTERMATIC mark in connection with any
goods or services of his own.' The judge held that Intermatic's name and
reputation would be at Toeppen's "mercy" and could be associated with a
93. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. 1l1. 1996).
94. See id. at 1230.
95. See id. at 1232.
96. See id. at 1230.
97. See id. at 1232.
98. See id.
99. See Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
100. See id. at 1239.
101. See id. at 1233.
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wide variety of messages on Toeppen's web page if the domain name were
allowed to remain with Toeppen.' °2
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,0 3 Panavision sued Dennis
Toeppen for registering the domain names "panavision.com" and
"panaflex.com." These were two federally registered trademarks owned by
Panavision for use in connection with theatrical motion picture and television
cameras and equipment."° Toeppen received a "cease and desist" letter from
Panavision, but Toeppen responded by saying that it would cost Panavision
$13,000 to have the domain names transferred." 5 Panavision refused to pay
and instead sued Toeppen under state and federal anti-dilution statutes. 6
Like the Illinois court in the Intermatic 'case, the California court found that
Panvision had widespread use of the marks, heavy advertising and promotion
of the marks, and that the marks had acquired secondary meaning through
many years of use by Panavsion.' 8 The judge further said that Toeppen
"prevented Panavision from using its marks in a new and important business
medium,"'0 9 and that "merely... registering a famous mark as a domain name
for the purpose of trading on the value of the mark by selling the domain name
to the trademark owner violates the federal and state dilution statutes. ' 10
Persons using a famous mark as a domain name to publish derogatory
information about the owner may also dilute a mark. In Planned Parenthood
Federation ofAmerica, Inc. v. Bucci, "the Defendant, Richard Bucci, was the
host of a daily radio talk show called "Catholic Radio." ' 2 Planned Parent-
hood, a well known organization which promotes and advocates pro-choice
abortion issues," ' also owned a federal trademark registration for the mark
PLANNED PARENTHOOD." 4  Bucci registered the domain name
"plannedparenthood.com," and published anti-abortion information on the
website, a position in direct conflict with Planned Parenthood's well known
mission."' Much of the information Bucci's web page promoted a book
102. See id. at 1239.
103. 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
104. See id. at 1298-99.
105. See id. at 1300.
106. See id.
107. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
108. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
109. See id at 1304.
110. See id.
11I. No. 97-Civ.-0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
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which advocated restrictions or bans on abortion." 6 The court granted an
injunction against Bucci preventing him from using PLANNED PARENT-
HOOD as a trademark or as a domain name." 7 The court held that Bucci's
promotion of the book was commercial in nature and that Bucci was a non-
profit political activist who solicits funds for his activities."8 The court also
noted that Bucci's actions were specifically intended to cause harm to Planned
Parenthood." 9
Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky 2° involved a non-profit, international outreach
ministry founded in 1973 that consisted of Jewish people who advocated and
followed the teachings of Jesus Christ. The group sued Brodsky, 2' a Jewish
Internet website developer, who had very strong and critical things to say
about their organization.'22 Brodsky had been quoted in the public media that
he believed that the organization was a "cult" that preyed upon Jewish people
through deceit and trickery. 1 3 Jews For Jesus had distributed religious
pamphlets and materials for over 20 years and in 1995 registered the
www.iews-for-iesus.org domain name. 24 The website contained many of the
organization's religious tracts available in electronic form.'25 In 1997,
Brodsky registered www.iewsforiesus.org and posted highly critical
statements about Jews For Jesus on the website. He also had links to other
Jewish organizations which had strong and highly critical statements about the
Jews For Jesus organization. 26 Brodsky admitted in court documents that his
"intent behind the bogus Jews For Jesus site is to intercept potential converts
before they have a chance to see the obscene garbage on the real site."' 27 The
court found that although the JEWS FOR JESUS mark may have been
descriptive when it was adopted, it had become distinctive and famous
through widespread advertising and promotion by the organization. 21 It also
said that Brodsky's mere use of the domain name to criticize and disparage
the Jews For Jesus organization was a commercial use in that he prevented
Jews For Jesus from fully exploiting their mark.'29 The court rejected
116. See id. at *2.
117. See Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *12.
118. See id. at *5.
119. See id.
120. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1908).
121. See id. at 288.
122. See id. at 290.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 288-89.
125. See id. at 290.
126. See Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 290-91.
127. See id. at 291.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 308.
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Brodsky's claim that his First Amendment rights would be violated by having
to give up the domain name. The court noted that Brodsky did not have a
right to use false and deceptive marks to confuse the public. Further, his
message was not barred because he could use another, non-confusing domain
name to post his message. 3
Do the Bucci and Brodsky decisions mean that all politically motivated
uses of someone else's mark are dilutions of famous marks? Probably not.
The federal anti-dilution act 3' specifically has provisions which allow for fair,
non-commercial, use of another's mark. It also has a "news" commentary and
reporting exception. ' In Bucci, the Defendant was doing far more than what
is normally considered a fair use, or non-commercial use. Also, the Brodsky
court held that intentional deception of the public and disparagement of a
trademark owner's services was a commercial use in and of itself. Finally,
both cases indicate that no one has a constitutional right to falsely identify
themselves to consumers, even if the message they seek to bring is political
or a matter of public interest.
It is no secret that pornography is rampant on the Internet and that the
vast majority of businesses, whether they have websites of their own or not,
would not want to have their valuable names, trademarks, and service marks
associated with pornography. This is the ultimate dilution of a mark. In
Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd,'33 Hasbro, a maker of toys
and children's games ran into this problem. Hasbro owned a federal
registration for CANDYLAND, a children's game.'34 The defendants had
registered www.candyland.com as a domain name for a sexually explicit
website.'35 Thejudge in Hasbro did not hesitate to issue an injunction against
the pornographic website based on dilution grounds.'36
The defendant cybersquatter in Avery-Dennison v. Sumpton3 7 registered
over 12,000 surnames as Internet domain names with the .NET designation. 3
Sumpton would then lease the domain names to people who had these
surnames to use as e-mail addresses, i.e. bill(smith.net' 39 Two of the 12,000
surnames registered were "Avery" and "Dennison."' 40 Avery Dennison, an
130. See id. at 312-13.
131. See 15 U.S.C. § II25(c)(1998).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(c)(4) (1998).
133. No. C96-13OWD, 1996 WL 84853, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996).
134. See id. at *1.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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office products manufacturer, owned federal trademark registrations for
"Avery" and "Dennison."'' It also had domain name registrations for
www.avery.com and www.averydennison.com' 42 The court found that the
Plaintiff's marks were famous and that defendant's domain name registrations
diluted the marks. In some strongly worded language, the court said: "It is the
registration of the trademark name as a domain name, which denies the holder
of the famous trademark from using its trademark name as an Internet domain
name, that dilutes the ability to identify goods and services.' 43
On August 23, 1999, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in the
Avery-Dennison case. The key factor in reversing the lower court was the
Ninth Circuit's finding that while "Avery" and "Dennison," two relatively
common surnames, may have "acquired distinctiveness" through long use and
heavy advertising, the marks were not also "famous."'" The court held that
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and its California counterpart dilution act
"requires a showing greater than distinctiveness to meet the threshold element
of fame; as a matter of law, Avery-Dennison has failed to fulfill this
burden."'145 Not only did the Ninth Circuit reverse the lower court's awarding
of summary judgment in favor of Avery-Dennison for $300 each, the Ninth
Circuit instructed the district court to award summary judgment to Sumpton
and to take evidence on whether Avery-Dennison should be required to pay
Sumpton's attorneys fees.
46
The lesson to be learned from the highlighted cases is that each of the
plaintiffs owned federal trademark registrations for their respective marks. If
clients have not federally registered their marks with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, this is a good reason why they should. This is one of the specific
factors listed in the federal anti-dilution act'47 which a court is to consider in
the dilution analysis and one which many federal courts are weighing very
heavily in favor of the trademark owner in dilution cases. It is also highly
relevant in using a domain name registry's domain name dispute policy.
48
Furthermore, if you are on the defendant's side of a dilution claim, the fact
141. See id.
142. See id. at 1341.
143. See Avery-Dennison, 999 F. Supp. at 1341. However, since Sumpton had no specific
intent to sell the domain names back to Avery Dennison or even the highest bidder, it ordered
that principles of equity required Avery Dennison to pay Sumpton the sum of $300 per domain
name. The court observed that if Sumpton sold all 12,000 of his domain names for $300, he
would make a profit of $2.4 million. See id. at 1342.
144. See Avery-Dennison v. Sumpton, No. 98-55810, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19954, at * 1
(9th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(H)(1998).
148. See discussion under Section VI1, infra.
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that your client also has a federally registered trademark for one similar to the
plaintiff's could be useful in showing that the plaintiffs mark is not
distinctive.
XII. COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS IN CYBERSPACE
Copyrights are also infringed by Internet websites. For example, an
infringer could post someone else's copyrighted materials on the infringer's
own website. The owner of a website could also link to another's website
without permission. Briefly, copyrights are a "bundle" of rights defined by
federal statute,'49 which give the copyright owner the exclusive right to do or
authorize others to do any of the following: (1) Reproduce the copyrighted
work; (2) Prepare a derivative work based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) Distribute copies or phono records of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or lending; (4) In the
case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works pantomimes and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, the exclusive right to perform
the copyrighted works publicly; (5) In the case of literary, musical, dramatic
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works, including individual images from motion picture or other audio-visual
works, the exclusive right to display the copyrighted work publicly; (6) In the
case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted works publicly by means
of digital audio transmission. 5°
The above rights exist in what the Copyright Act defines as "original
works of authorship," which are fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which the works can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.' The Copyright Act defines works of authorship as
"literary works, musical works, including the accompanying words, dramatic
works, including any accompanying music, pantomimes and choreographic
works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other
audio-visual works, sound recordings and architectural works."'52
Copyrights do not exist in ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods
of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries regardless of the form in
which they are described, explained, illustrated, or embodied.'53 Because
most computers nowadays can reproduce and display, text, graphics, photos,
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1998).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1994).
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motion pictures, video and audio, in near perfect quality, copyrightable works
are easily infringed through the Internet.
There are three types of copyright infringement: direct, contributory, and
vicarious. Direct copyright infringement occurs when the defendant actually
violates one of the copyright holder's exclusive rights under Section 106 of
the Copyright Act." 4 However, in many cases the direct infringer either
cannot be located or is financially insolvent. In such cases some copyright
owners have used contributory and vicarious copyright infringement theories
can hold more financially solvent third parties such as Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), Bulletin Board Service (BBSs) operators and webpage
hosting services liable for assisting others in committing copyright infringe-
ments through Internet websites. Contributory copyright infringement occurs
when the defendant has knowledge of the infringing activity and induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.'
Vicarious copyright infringement occurs when the defendant has the right and
ability to control the infringer's acts and the defendant receives a direct
financial benefit from the infringement. 6
One egregious case of contributory copyright infringement is discussed
in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Maphia'57 In this case, Maphia was a BBS
operator who allowed subscribers to the service to upload or download
bootleg copies of Sega video games. Maphia sold devices which facilitated
the copying of the games. Specifically, the devices would allow someone to
dump the software from a Sega video game cartridge onto an ordinary
computer floppy disk.5 It also sold adapters to allow Sega games down-
loaded on ordinary floppy disks to be used in Sega game machines.'59 He also
actively encouraged subscribers to upload and download games to the BBS. '60
The court held that Maphia did not commit direct infringement, that is, the
user of the service was the person who actually copied the programs.' 6'
However, Maphia was found liable for contributory copyright infringement
because it knew of the infringing activity, actively solicited people to commit
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1994).
155. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Sega
Enter. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Religious Tech. Ctr v. Netcom On-line
Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
156. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
157. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
158. See id at 928-29.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 932.
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direct infringements and it profited financially from the sale of devices to
facilitate the copying as well as through subscription fees.
62
Due to widespread concern by ISPs and BBSs over virtually unlimited
liability for acts of subscribers who commit copyright infringements through
the use of their services, Congress placed a limitation on liability for such
services in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 163 enacted last year. It
amended the Copyright Act to provide limitations on liability for ISPs or
BBSs for alleged direct or contributory infringement related to the infringing
activities of users or subscribers. It also imposes certain duties on ISPs and
BBSs in order to take advantage of the new law's limitations on liability.
The new law specifically exempts ISPs and BBSs from liability for direct
copyright infringement committed if the claim is based solely on the fact that
the provider transmitted, routed, or provided connections to a user or
subscriber who posts infringing material and the transmission, routing or
temporary storage of the infringing material is carried out through an
automatic, technical process without selection of the material by the service
provider."6 The provider also cannot select the recipients except through an
automatic response to the request of another.'65 It limits contributory
infringement liability based solely on providing access to infringing materials
if the ISP or BBS has no prior knowledge of the infringing material, it
expeditiously removes or disables access to the material once it receives
notice of the infringement, and it receives no financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity."' 6 The law also limits liability for
merely providing links to infringing material on another website provided the
ISP or BBS does not have actual knowledge or, in the absence of such
knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which an infringement
should be readily apparent.'67 The ISP or BBS also cannot receive a financial
benefit directly related to the link to the infringing material and it must
respond expeditiously to remove or disable the link upon notice of a claimed
infringement. 68
ISPs or BBSs who wish to take advantage of the limitations must
designate an agent to receive notifications of claimed copyright infringement
to both the United States Copyright Office and to the general public through
access to the ISP's or BBS's own website.'69 ISPs and BBSs are exempt from
162. See id. at 933.
163. 17 U.S.C. § 512 ((1994).
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3)-(2).
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3).
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
167. See 17 U.S.C § 512(c).
168. See 17 U.S.C § 512(c).
169. See 1 7 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (1994).
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liability if they disconnect or disable access to a website accused of copyright
infringements, even if it is later determined that the website owner did not
commit copyright infringement. 7 To guard against frivolous, false, and
unmeritorious claims of copyright infringement, the new act imposes liability
if the plaintiff knowingly or materially misrepresents that the on-line activity
complained of is infringing. 7' If so, the plaintiff is liable to the defendant for
damages, including court costs and attorney fees.
72
XIII. LINKING, FRAMING, AND METATAGGING
Some legal issues that are far from settled with respect to copyright or
trademark infringement involve "linking,"' 73  "framing," '  and
"metatagging." ''  Some view out-links as nothing more than the equivalent
of a footnote or legal citation. However, an equally strong argument is that
these links, if made without the permission of the linked website's owner,
violate that owner's right to reproduce, display, or create derivative works
from copyrighted material.' 76 There is also the issue of whether one should
obtain permission to link. By and large, most website owners never bother to
get permission to link from their websites to those of others. In many cases,
however, linked website owners do not object because such practices further
their goal ofdisseminnating their website's information to as many people as
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (1994).
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1994).
172. See 17 U.S.C § 512(f).
173. See generally PC Webopaedia (last modified Nov. 25, 1997)
<http://webopedia.internet.comrERM/l/link.html>. Linking is the process that allows the
transfer of information stored on one computer to another computer without having to type the
web address of each site. A link is nothing more than storing the Internet web address of the
linked site on the linking site. Linking allows Internet sites to connect, simply by having the
user "click" on a designated area on the site. Linking may lead to another file in the same web-
site, or to a file on a different computer located elsewhere on the Internet. See id.
174. See generally PC Webopaedia (last modified June 16, 1997)
<http://webopedia.intemet.com/TERM/f/frames.html>. Framing is another type of link;
however, instead of sending the computer user away or out from the linking website, the linking
website brings information from another website to the user of its website. Often times this
information is surrounded by a "frame" so that the website user is still looking at the original
website, but the information within the frame is being imported from some other site.
175. See Alan Richmond, META Taggingfor Search Engines (visited June 24, 1999)
<http://www.stars.com/Search/MetaTag.html>. Metatags are key words used primarily by
search engines to index, identify, and document contents of a web page. Metatags are invisible
to computer users. An example of what a computer metatag looks like is attached to the
appendix. The key-word portion of the metatag reviewed by web-browsing programs is
highlighted in boldface.
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1994& Supp. 11 1996).
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possible. However, one should not assume that because one website owner
didn't object to a link to their site, doesn't mean that someone else will not.
Framing is probably a more serious threat to copyright and trademark
properties than linking. Two of the first cases on framing are Washington
Post Co. v. TotalNews, Inc. '7 and Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics,
Inc.'78 Total News operated a website that made news sources from all over
the world available on a single website. 7 9 The company placed a frame
around the entire border of the computer screen. At the top was the Total
News logo. The side of the frame featured links to various newspapers,
magazines, and news services, such as the Washington Post.8 ' The lower part
of the frame featured advertising sold by Total News to third parties. 8 ' When
one accessed one of the links, such as the Washington Post, the Total News
website would pull in the information from the Post website so that it
appeared within the Total News frame.'82 The Post and several other
publications included on the Total News links sued Total News, alleging
copyright, trademark, and unfair competition claims.'83 On June 5, 1997 the
parties settled, with Total News agreeing to eliminate its frame. 8 4 However,
Total News was allowed to maintain out-links to the other news sources,
provided that the links were in plain text and did not feature the stylization,
logos, or graphics of any of the other news sources. 5 In addition, the links
could not imply any sort of sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Total
News's service by any of the plaintiff organizations.'86
Futuredontics owned a website that provided dental referral services.'87
It sued Applied Anagramics for framing material from Futuredontics's website
in Applied Anagramics site.'88 Futuredontics claimed that Applied
Anagramics's act of framing violated its right to create derivative works of its
copyrighted materials. 8 9 The court denied Applied Anagramics Motion to
177. No. 97-Civ.-1190 (S.D.N.Y June 5, 1997).
178. No. CV 97-6991 ABC (MANX), 1998 WL 132922, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998),
affd 152 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998).
179. See Publishers Settle Dispute Over Framing with Web Site Owners, ANDREWS







185. See Publishers Settle Dispute, supra note 179, at 24, 327.
186. See Publishers Settle Dispute, supra note 179, at 24, 327.
187. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., No. CV 97-6991 ABC (MANX),
1998 WL 132922, at *2008 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998), affid, 152 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998).
188. See id. at *2009.
189. See id.
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Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, because Futuredontics adequately stated
a copyright infringement claim based on its allegations of framing the
copyrighted materials.' 90
Metatags are key words used primarily by computer search engines and
web browers to locate and identify relevant websites in response to a search
request. A metatag is essentially an electronic version of a library's card
catalog that includes much of the information found on a card catalog entry,
i.e. author or personal names, the subject matter of the website and any other
information the website owner deems relevant or desirable. Many search
engines rely heavily on key word metatags to specify a list of terms that the
engine will associate with the particular webpage. When the user enters a key
word into a search engine, the search engine returns the address of the sites
containing matching key word metatags. Before long, "metataggers"
discovered that by incorporating competitors' names or trademarks into the
metatags for their websites, computer users conducting an Internet search with
a competitor's name or mark would find the metagger's website listed among
the search results. The following cases illustrate some of the issues involved
in metatagging.
Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group, L.L.C 19'
involved two competing companies in the construction supply business.
National Envirotech, a competitor of Insituform's, implanted the words
"INSITUPIPE"' 192 and "INSITUFORM"' 93 into metatags for its website. Both
words are federal trademarks registered to Insituform. National Envirotech
did not simply metatag the Insituform marks in its website. It also displayed
portions of Insituform's marketing materials on National Envirotech's
website, causing consumers to assume a connection existed between the two
companies. 94 The case settled, with National Envirotech agreeing not to use
Insituform's trademarks in its metatags or on its website.1 95
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 196 the defendant
registered Internet domain names that incorporated Playboy's trademarks with
Network Solutions, Inc.' 97 Calvin Designer also used "Playboy" in the
metatag for its website and repeated the words "Playboy" and "Playmate"
190. See id. at *2010.
191. No. 97-2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1997).
192. See U.S. Registration No. 1643612.
193. See U.S. Registration No. 1216690.
194. See New Legal Issues: Use of Meta Tags, COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, September,
1997, available in WESTLAW, CLST database.
195. See id.
196. 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).




hundreds of times in black lettering against a black background, making the
words invisible to the computer user, but detectable by a search engine.'98
This enabled Calvin Designer's website to rank at or near the top of the return
list by some search engines whenever a computer user searched the terms
"PLAYBOY" or "PLAYMATE.' ' 99 The court ordered the defendant to
immediately stop using the PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE trademarks in
connection with its website, and required the defendant to delete the marks
from its website's metatags.
Perhaps the first case to deal solely with the issue of misleading metatags
was Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts.20' Oppedahl & Larson is a
law firm specializing in intellectual property law, and, in particular, intellec-
tual property issues on the Internet. 202 Advanced Concepts is a webpage-
design service that used the Oppedahl & Larson service marks in its
metatags. 23 Advanced Concepts and Oppedahl & Larson were not direct
competitors in any aspect of their respective businesses, but Advanced
Concepts wanted to gain hits from a well-known law firm in this particular
area of law. Advanced Concepts did not use the Oppedahl & Larson marks
in any other manner in connection with their website except in the invisible
metatags.2° Oppedahl & Larson brought the action against Advance Concepts
for federal unfair competition, federal dilution, common-law unfair competi-
tion, and common-law trademark infringement."' The case settled, with
Advance Concepts agreeing to remove Oppedahl & Larson marks from its
metatags.2 6 The question as to whether a trademark infringement or dilution
occurs from merely using another's trademark in a metatag is not settled.
However, there are lower federal court decisions which suggest such a
practice may be permissible in some cases.
In Playboy Enterprises v. Welles,20 7 Playboy sued former Playmate Terri
Welles for using the wording "Playmate" and "Playboy" in metatags for her
personal website and for using the wording "Playmate of the Year" in the title
of her homepage. °8 Ms. Welles was in fact Playmate of the Year in 1981 and
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1221-22.
201. No. 97-Z-1592, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18359, at *1 (C.D. Colo. Feb. 6, 1998).
202. See Law Firm Alleges "Meta Tagging" Violates Trademark Laws, ANDREWS





206. See Oppendahl & Larson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18359.
207. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aft'd, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998).
208. See id. at 1100-01.
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had appeared in many of Playboy's magazines. °9 The court held that her use
of the term constituted a fair use and did not infringe Playboy's marks because
the title "Playmate of the Year" was bestowed upon her by Playboy. ° It is
important to note that Ms. Welles minimized all references to Playboy on her
website and included disclaimers that her website was not affiliated with or
sponsored by Playboy. In addition, her website acknowledged Playboy's
trademark ownership of the terms "Playboy" and "Playmate."'
The Welles case clearly suggests that the use of another's trademark in
a metatag is notper se trademark infringement or dilution. Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp. v. Faber"2 is another case holding that the use of another's
mark in a metatag is permissible under certain circumstances. The Bally court
stated:
[T]he average Internet user may want to receive all the information
available on Bally. The user may want to access the official Internet site
to see how Bally sells itself. Likewise, the user may also want to be
apprised of the opinions of others about Bally. This individual will be
unable to locate sites containing outside commentary unless those sites
include Bally's marks in the machine readable code upon which search
engines rely. Prohibiting Faber from using Bally's name in the machine
readable code would effectively isolate him from all but the most savvy of
Internet users. 213
XIV. THE FUTURE OF DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION
An affirmative answer to the question of whether to add new top-level
domains is viewed by many as opening new territories to a cyber-land rush.
There are proposals to add other top-level domains, such as .BUS, .STORE,
.FILM, .BANK, .ENT, .ARTS, and several others for specific types of
businesses.'24 Those arguing in favor of adding such designations say that the
additional designations will help reduce confusion by making it more clear to
the computer user the type of business offered by the domain-name registrant.
It will also allow trademark owners prevented from using their trademark as
a domain name because of a prior domain name registration, to use their
trademark as a domain name. However, while it is possible that consumers
209. See id. at 1!O00.
210. See id at 1102.
211. Seeid. at ll04.
212. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
213. See id. at 1165 (footnote omitted).
214. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and Addresses




will be able to distinguish "xyz.film" from "xyz.bank," will they be able to
distinguish the source of "xyz.com" from "xyz.bus" or "xyz.store," particu-
larly if the business in question is a retailer with stores, catalogs and on-line
or electronic retailing services? Trademark owners are concerned that
additional top-level domains will force them to register more domain names
to prevent others from registering first. They are also concerned that the
additions will make it more difficult and expensive to police the Internet for
confusingly similar websites and domain names.
XV. INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME ISSUES
A domain-name registration secured in the United States is not necessar-
ily secured world-wide, for each country has its own domain-name registry.
Therefore, if a client or business has extensive business operations overseas,
then it should also look into registering its name in those countries as well.
Some countries have profited greatly from registering domain names.
For example, each country that hooks into the worldwide web is given a two-
letter country code that appears immediately after the second-level domain
name, i.e. www.xvz.us.com. Two countries that experienced booms in
domain-name registrations were Turkmenistan, whose country code is "tm,"
and American Samoa, whose code is "as." Many common-law countries, such
as the United States, use the letters "tm" to serve as notice of a common-law
or unregistered trademark. Some companies and domain name profiteers have
registered famous trademarks in Turkmenistan because its "tm" country code
is the same as the "Trademark" abbreviation.25 Scandinavians took a
particular interest in American Samoa because the two-letter "as" code is the
same as a common entity designator in Scandinavian countries." 6
Occasionally, new countries are granted new top-level domain name
designations by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA), a United
States-based authority that assigns Internet addresses.217 Whenever this
happens, the usual result is a rush to register domain names for people who
have previously been denied registration elsewhere. Another result is the
215. An example of this involves a well known Arkansas company, Wal-Mart, registered
as www.wal-mart.com in the United States. However, if someone types in www.wal-mart.tm,
for example, they will not get Wal-Mart in Bentonville, Arkansas. but whoever owns the Wal-
Mart domain name registration in Turkmenistan. In this case, a French-based Internet Service
Provider (ISP) owns the Turkmenistan domain name registration.
216. For example, the domain name www.volvo.as, which actually belongs to the Swedish
car manufacturer, is not on the Swedish domain-name registry but is on the American Samoa
registry located halfa world away from the car maker's home country.
217. See Christian Anderson, Approaches to Trademark Challenges Presented by Domain
Names, CLIENT TIMEs, Winter 1999, at I.
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opening of new territory for cybersquatters. Currently the rush is on to
register in the Keeling Islands (Cocos), a group of small islands in the Indian
ocean that are an off-shore territory of Australia.2t8 The islands were given
"cc" as their two-letter country designation.2t 9 As more top-level country
domains that are added to the Internet, it becomes increasingly likely that
confusingly similar domain names will be registered elsewhere in the world.
As for the people of the Cocos, they may never have to pay taxes again due to
the money earned from registering top level domain names.
XVI. PATENT LAW PROTECTION FOR WEBPAGE AND ICON DESIGNS
In addition to obtaining trademark and copyright law registrations for
computer websites, it may also be possible to get a design patent for website
features. A design patent confers the right to exclude others from making,
using or selling "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture."22 However, design patents must meet the requirements of
Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act.22' Section 102, called the "prior art"
restriction, imposes a requirement that the design was not used by others or
described in printed publications prior to the invention by the applicant.222
Section 103 basically says that even if the design is not exactly like that
described in the prior art, if the differences are such that the subject matter as
a whole was obvious to someone skilled in the trade at the time of the
invention, a design patent is not issued.223 This is the so-called "non-obvious-
ness" requirement. Assuming one meets the requirements to receive a design
patent for their website, there are pros and cons of having a design patent in
lieu of a copyright.
A. Design Patent Limitations
I. The Design Patent's Short Duration
A design patent term lasts for fourteen years. This is a short span of time
when compared to a copyright, which lasts ninety-five years for most
218. See id. Cocos has a population of slightly more than 600 people and all the islands
together are only about 24 times the size of the mall in Washington, D.C. See id.
219. See id.
220. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
221. See35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)-103 (1994).
222. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). For example, the invention was described in a printed
publication anywhere in the world or was in use or for sale in this country more than one year
prior to the filing of the patent application.
223. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. 111. 1997).
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institutional owners and works created for hire,224 and for the life of the
individual or the last survivor, if more than one, plus 70 years, if the copyright
is owned by an individual or individuals.225 Assume that an individual sole
proprietor who designs a webpage is currently twenty-two years of age, and
the work is not "for hire," i.e. not designed for an employer or third party. If
the individual lives to age 100, the copyright would last nearly midway
through the 22nd century.226 However, if the designer obtains a design patent
for the webpage, it would expire when the designer turns 36.
2. The Design Patent's Lengthy and Expensive Application Process
A design patent will take months, perhaps as long as a couple of years,
to get through the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and will cost several
hundred dollars in filing fees and perhaps a few thousand dollars in attorney's
fees. The benefits of having a design patent are not effective until the patent
is actually granted by the government. Copyright benefits, on the other hand,
arise the moment the design is reduced into a form that can be reproduced or
viewed.227 Furthermore, an application for copyright registration with the
Copyright Office costs thirty dollars and can be filed by the applicant without
much difficulty.
3. Limited Protection of Design Patents
The protection afforded by a design patent is only for whatever is listed
in the patent claim, that is, how the patent owner describes what the patent is.
Therefore, if the webpage design is changed, the patent would not necessarily
protect the new design. It would only allow the patent holder to keep someone
from using the old, patented, design. Also, a design patent would not protect
the content, or substantive information, contained on the webpage, nor would
it prevent anyone from calling or identifying their website by a name
substantially similar to patent holder's.
224. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(c) (West Supp. 1999). As measured from the date of first
publication of the website. See id
225. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1999).
226. To be exact, the copyright would last until the year 2147.
227. See 17 U.S.C § 102 (1994).
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4. Design Patents and Trademark Registrations Compared and
Contrasted
While a little more difficult to obtain than a copyright registration, it is
possible that the overall design of a webpage could also function as a source
identifying service mark. If the design is inherently distinctive, it could be
registered on the Principal Trademark Register without having to show
secondary meaning or "acquired distinctiveness." '228 If the design is not
inherently distinctive but not purely functional, i.e. the design is merely
ornamental or decorative, then it could be registered after showing that
consumers have come to recognize the design as a source identifier for a
service through long, continuous, and exclusive use by the applicant and/or
extensive promotion of the particular design as a source identifying mark. 29
If the webpage is actually being used in connection with a service, rights
would begin once it was used to identify and distinguish a service from those
of others. If the webpage is not actually used in connection with the
performance of a service,"' i.e. it is a personal webpage, an inactive webpage,
under construction, reserved for future use, or merely advertises a company's
own goods and services, then the overall design could not be claimed as a
service mark no matter how distinctive it might be. If it is a service mark,
however the duration of the mark, unlike a design patent or copyright, can last
for as long as it is used to identify the service, i.e. forever.23" '
B. The Advantage of Obtaining a Design Patent
What is the upside of having a design patent? Recall that with copy-
rights, one cannot get copyright protection for procedures, processes, systems
or methods of operation. Therefore, the portion of a webpage that falls under
one of these categories, such as a stylized icon or the way the icons are
arranged or laid out on the page, would not be copyrightable if it is found to
be a process, system or method of operation. 32 Similarly, purely functional
228. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(i) (1994) (addressing merely descriptive and deceptively
misdescriptive marks); supra text accompanying note 17 (discussing merely descriptive and
deceptively misdescriptive marks).
229. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., 514 U.S. 159(1995); Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
230. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1994).
23 1. Of course, if federally registered, one would have to renew the registration every 10
years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (1994). But even one failed to renew. the right to continue
using it would not expire. See id.
232. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR ON-LINE WORKS, CIRCULAR 66 (1998).
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matter, like an icon that performs a specific operational function, cannot serve
as a trademark or service mark, nor can webpage designs that do not identify
services performed for third parties. However, such things could be the
subject of a design patent if they otherwise meet the requirements for design
patent registration under the Patent Act.233 The PTO has issued design patents
for computer icons that are features used in computer software."' Therefore,
it could be possible to get a design patent to protect similar features of a
webpage that would not otherwise be protected under copyright or trademark
law.
XVI. CONCLUSION
What will the future hold for intellectual property in the virtual wild wild
west? Hopefully, many of the novel issues being raised today involving
linking, framing, and metatagging will become settled principals of law in the
early years of the next century so that the public and intellectual property
owners will know what constitutes an infringement or a dilution and what
does not. Courts will hopefully fashion a system governing the use of
trademarks in metatags that fairly balances the rights of trademark owners
with the public's First Amendment freedom of speech rights. Ideally, the
system would allow use of a trademark in a website's metatag for non-
commercial purposes but would prohibit other website owners from capitaliz-
ing on the fame or reputation of a another's intellectual property for personal
or economic gain.
It is not likely that the current top-level domain name abbreviations,
.COM, .NET, .ORG, .EDU, .INT, .GOV, and .MIL will last indefinitely. As
more people begin using the Internet to purchase goods and services, and as
more companies develop electronic marketing and retailing plans, the pressure
on the federal government to increase the number of commercial, top-level
domains will probably become too great to resist. More top-level domains
will likely proliferate the problems that trademark owners encounter with
cybersquatters and may not effectively alleviate consumer confusion as to the
source of highly similar domain names. This will make the need to obtain
federal registration for trademarks and service marks even more important in
order for a trademark owner to adequately deal with cybersquatters and
Internet infringers. It will also likely increase the value of having an older
".COM" domain as many users of the Internet automatically or instinctively
default to this domain when searching for a business.
233. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
234. See, e.g., design patent numbers 385,549; 385,864; and 386,476.
[Vol. 22
THE VIRTUAL WILD, WILD WEST
In terms of copyrighted works, the more advanced computers become in
making virtually perfect reproductions and copies of sound, video, still photos,
graphics, and text, the more likely it will be that such works will be infringed
on a massive scale. The creators of copyrightable works, as well as trademark
owners, will need to exercise vigilance in patrolling the Internet for infringers
and will need to act quickly to stop the activity. If not, they risk losing their
right to control the manner by which their intellectual works are distributed,
used and displayed. This is not unlike the real property concept of adverse
possession." 5 If a land owner fails to take appropriate action against an
adverse possessor in a timely fashion, then the land owner can lose his or her
ownership rights in the land. The main difference, however, is that in the
virtual world adverse possession of intellectual property will happen on a
much larger, and much faster, scale.
235. Adverse possession is described as follows:
[a] method of acquisition of title to real property by possession for a statutory
period under certain conditions; it consists of actual possession with intent to hold
solely for possessor to exclusion of others and is denoted by exercise of acts of
dominion over land including making of ordinary use and taking of ordinary
profits of which land is susceptible ....
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 49 (5th ed. 1979) (internal citations omitted).
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